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LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING CHILDREN
Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. *
I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines the pertinent legislative and judicial de-
velopments of the past year that have effected juvenile law in
Virginia. Specifically, this article discusses new laws and
amendments passed by the Virginia General Assembly with re-
spect to juvenile delinquency, non-criminal misbehavior, and
termination of parental rights. Part IV discusses changes to Title
22.1 of the Virginia Code that affect school disciplinary matters.
Part V examines developments in the area of juvenile mental
health. Finally, Part VI discusses various miscellaneous devel-
opments affecting youth abortions, teenage driving, parental neg-
ligence in the tort context, and a significant amendment made to
the Comprehensive Services Act for At-Risk Youth and Families.
Discussion of relevant case law supplements each topical section.
II. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND NON-CRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR
A. Legislative Developments
Consistent with its actions over recent years the General As-
sembly enacted legislation allowing more access to law enforce-
ment and court records involving juveniles, and by increasing
communication between the juvenile justice system and the
schools. For example, it enacted legislation permitting the chief
law-enforcement officer of a locality to disclose to a school princi-
pal that a juvenile student is a suspect in, or has been charged
* Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of Richmond School of Law. B.A., 1959,
LL.B., 1961, Washington and Lee University.
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with, a violent juvenile felony, a crime involving arson or bombs,
or a crime involving weapons.' Another law allows the Depart-
ment of Juvenile Justice to release confidential information from
the Virginia Juvenile Justice Information System, but only as
provided for in Virginia Code section 16.1-300.2
The assembly also rewrote the "threats" statute3 to provide
that it is a Class 6 felony to "knowingly communicate[ ], in a writ-
ing.., a threat to kill or do bodily injury... [which creates a]
reasonable apprehension of death or bodily injury [in someone]."'
The statute also provides that a person is guilty of a Class 6 fel-
ony if he or she threatens in a writing, which includes electronic
communications, "to kill or do bodily harm" on school grounds, at
a school event, or on a school bus "regardless of whether the per-
son who is the object of the threat actually receives the threat."5
The threat need only be written in such a fashion that the recipi-
ent of it would have a "reasonable apprehension of death or bodily
harm."6 In the wake of post-Columbine era concerns about school
violence, the Virginia Code now provides that a juvenile who
makes a bomb threat shall be additionally punished by being de-
prived of their privilege to drive for one year.7
With respect to such things as detentions and commitments to
mental health facilities, a new law provides that a hearing dead-
line continues to the next day that is not a legal holiday or week-
end day if the maximum period for the hearing ends on a holiday
or weekend.'
A statute to become effective on July 1, 2002, was amended at
the 2001 session to provide that if a period of post-dispositional
confinement of a juvenile for delinquency is to exceed thirty days,
the youth must be committed to the Department of Juvenile Jus-
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-301(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001). Under previous law, information
about a juvenile, fourteen years of age or older, could be released only when the juvenile
was arrested for violent juvenile felonies. See id. § 16.1-301 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
2. Id. § 16.1-300 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
3. Id. § 18.2-60 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
4. Id. § 18.2-60(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
5. Id. § 18.2-60(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
6. Id.
7. Id. § 16.1-278.9(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
8. S.B. 906, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (enacted as Act of Apr. 5, 2001, ch.
837, 2001 Va. Acts 1178) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the Virginia Code).
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tice to serve that confinement.9 The statute also provides that a
juvenile who has been released from the department within the
previous eighteen months is not eligible for post-dispositional de-
tention. ° A further change allows a circuit court to treat a trans-
ferred juvenile as a serious juvenile offender and commit the
youth to the department regardless of whether he or she meets
existing criteria regarding their criminal background if, upon re-
view of the juvenile's entire criminal history, such action is justi-
fied."
Another piece of legislation more precisely delineates the re-
spective responsibilities of the Department of Juvenile Justice
and social services over parole supervision of juveniles released
from a juvenile correctional facility. 2 The legislation provides
that the court service units will be responsible for those juveniles
committed to the department. 3 The same bill also gives the court
the authority to place a child fourteen or older into a detention fa-
cility for up to ten days for a violation of probation. 4 The law also
makes clear that the juvenile court retains authority over an
adult on probation or parole for violations committed as a juve-
nile. 5 In addition, the bill also clarifies the type of evidence re-
quired to revoke probation or parole by repealing the language in
Virginia Code section 16.1-291 requiring revocation proceedings
to be governed by the same standard of proof and evidence as the
original adjudicatory hearing. 6
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-284.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2001). The significant change is that
such action is now mandatory rather than discretionary.
10. Id. § 16.1-284.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
11. Id. § 16.1-285.1 (Cum. Supp. 2001). This amendment appears to validate the dis-
cretion in the circuit court permitted by the Court of Appeals of Virginia in Jackson v.
Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 418, 421, 512 S.E.2d 838, 840 (Ct. App. 1999).
12. S.B. 1296, VA. GEN. ASSEMBLY (REG. SESS. 2001) (enacted As ACT OF APR. 5, 2001),
CH. 853, 2001 VA. ACTS 1560) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-233 to -237, -
285, -291, -293, 63.1-248.3 (Cum. Supp. 2001)).
13. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-235 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
14. See id. § 16.1-291(C)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
15. See id. § 16.1-291(E) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
16. See id. § 16.1-291(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001). The amendment negates the ruling by
the Court of Appeals of Virginia in Pannell v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 287, 540 S.E.2d
527 (Ct. App. 2001) (en banc). In Pannell, the full court of appeals held that probation and
parole revocation proceedings pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-291 must follow the pro-
cedural and evidentiary requirements of the original, underlying proceeding. Pannell, 34
Va. App. at 294-95, 540 S.E.2d at 531.
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An amendment to Virginia Code section 18.2-55" provides that
it is a Class 5 felony for an accused being investigated by, or a
probationer or parolee under the supervision of, a probation or
parole officer, or a local pretrial services officer, to willfully inflict
a bodily injury on such officer.'" Another law provides that any
employee of the Department of Juvenile Justice, a secure facility,
a detention home, or a court services unit, who carnally knows
any youth in a facility or detention home, or under their supervi-
sion, is guilty of a Class 6 felony.'9 Another amendment adds the
Virginia Department of Military Affairs to the list of juvenile
residential facilities that require a criminal background check as
a condition of employment or volunteering.
B. Case Law
In Commonwealth v. Chatman,2" the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia held that a juvenile has neither a due process nor a statu-
tory right to assert an insanity defense in a delinquency proceed-
ing.22 The decision reversed the holding of the court of appeals,23
which had followed the majority of states that had considered the
issue." House Bill 265325 introduced in the 2001 Session, wouldhave implemented the recommendations of a study that was con-
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-55 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
18. Id. § 18.2-55(B) (Cum. Supp. 2001). This section currently does not apply to an ac-
cused person as the perpetrator or to a local pretrial services officer as the victim. See id.
19. Id. § 18.2-64.2 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
20. Id. § 63.1-248.7:2 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
21. 260 Va. 562, 538 S.E.2d 304 (2000).
22. Id. at 567-70, 538 S.E.2d at 306-07.
23. See Chatman v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 593, 518 S.E.2d 847 (Ct. App. 1999).
24. At least seven states, either directly or by implication, recognize an insanity de-
fense for juveniles by statute or rule. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 25 (West 1999); MASs. GEN.
LAWS ch. 123, § 15 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-258 (1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-40
(West 1987); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT (43A) § 335.1 (Consol. 1999); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §
55.51 (Vernon Supp. 2001); VT. FAM. R. PROC. 1(a)(1). Other states acknowledge such a
defense for juveniles in their case law. See Exparte Dep't of Mental Health, 511 So. 2d 181
(Ala. 1987); Interest of Causey, 363 So. 2d 472 (La. 1978); In re Devon T., 584 A.2d 1287
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (until age 14); In re Hamil, 431 N.E.2d 317 (Ohio 1982); Matter
of L.J., 552 P.2d 1322 (Or. Ct. App. 1976); In re Winburn, 145 N.W.2d 178 (Wis. 1966).
Only two jurisdictions before Virginia appear to have rejected the availability of the de-
fense in family court. See IKM. v. State, 983 S.W.2d 93 (Ark. 1998); Matter of C.W.M., 407
A.2d 617 (D.C. 1979).
25. H.B. 2653, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001).
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ducted by the Virginia Bar Association,26 pursuant to a General
Assembly resolution.27 The bill would have established an insan-
ity defense for juveniles.2" Instead, the bill was killed in Senate
Finance after passing the House 99-0 and being reported out of
the Senate Courts of Justice Committee 15-0.29 Nevertheless, the
assembly did adopt Senate Joint Resolution 440, which directs
the Joint Commission on Behavioral Health Care, in conjunction
with the Virginia State Crime Commission and the Virginia
Commission on Youth, to study treatment options for offenders
who have mental illness or substance abuse disorders.0
In Heath v. Commonwealth,"' the Supreme Court of Virginia af-
firmed an en banc determination of the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia32 that no violation of the Speedy Trial Statute33 occurred de-
spite the fact that Heath was incarcerated for more than five
months between his preliminary hearing in juvenile court and his
circuit court trial.34 The court decided that a period of forty days
was tolled by the youth's motion for a competency evaluation and
the fact that he did not object to another delay of twenty-seven
days between the fixing of the trial date and the trial itself.35 The
fact that no trial date had been fixed at the time of the compe-
tency evaluation motion and that the trial had been delayed by
the Commonwealth's motion for a blood test did not change the
fact that the forty days should be charged to Heath because a
trial could not have been held while the competency issue was left
unresolved.36
26. See REPORT ON THE ADJUDICATION OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS, H. Doc. No. 60 (2000).
27. See H.J. Res. 680, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999).
28. Va. H.B. 2653.
29. Detailed information about House Bill 2653's path through the General Assembly
may be found by using the Virginia Legislative Information System's searchable database.
For further details, see Bills and Resolutions: 2001 Session, at http'//legl.state.va.us/
011/bil.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2001).
30. S.J. Res. 440, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001). The commission was also re-
quested to study the not guilty by reason of insanity defense for juveniles. See id.
31. 261 Va. 389, 541 S.E.2d 906(2001).
32. Heath v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 176, 526 S.E.2d 798 (Ct. App. 2000) (en
banc), affd, 261 Va. 389, 541 S.E.2d 906 (2001).
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-243 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
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In Shackleford v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of
Virginia ruled that a juvenile defendant had waived his Baker
rights" regarding the lack of notice to his father. In addition,
the court of appeals held that the defendant's rights under the
Vienna Convention 4' as a foreign national were not violated, that
he had properly waived his Miranda rights, and that the evidence
was sufficient to find him guilty of the charged offenses.4' The
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the lower court's conclu-
42sions.
This past year witnessed two significant court of appeals' cases
regarding jurisdiction of the juvenile courts. In Spain v. Com-
monwealth,43 the court of appeals concluded that although the de-
fendant waived a transfer hearing in the juvenile court in 1995
while a juvenile, that waiver did not negate the necessity of giv-
ing notice to his parents of the hearing in juvenile court.' Such
failure constituted a jurisdictional defect, rendering invalid all
subsequent judicial proceedings.45
In Asby v. Commonwealth,46 however, the court of appeals
ruled that Asby's conviction as an adult in January of 1996 di-
vested the juvenile court of jurisdiction over other offenses then
pending in the lower court.47 Since the juvenile court no longer
had jurisdiction, the purported lack of notice to Asby's father did
not invalidate any subsequent proceedings in the circuit court.4"
In another important application of Baker, the Court of Ap-
37. 32 Va. App. 307, 528 S.E.2d 123 (Ct. App. 2000).
38. See Baker v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 306, 504 S.E.2d 394 (Ct. App. 1998),
affd per curiam, 258 Va. 1, 516 S.E.2d 219 (1999). For additional discussion of Baker and
related cases see Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Legal Issues
Involving Children, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 939, 939-45 (2000); Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., An-
nual Survey of Virginia Law: Legal Issues Involving Children, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 1001,
1007-08 (1999).
39. Shackleford, 32 Va. App. at 319, 528 S.E.2d at 129.
40. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, opened for signature Apr. 18, 1961,
500 U.N.T.S. 95.
41. See Shackleford, 32 Va. App. at 316-23, 528 S.E.2d at 128-31.
42. See Shackleford v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 196, 547 S.E.2d 899 (2001).
43. 35 Va. App. 431, 545 S.E.2d 583 (Ct. App. 2001).
44. Id. at 435, 545 S.E.2d at 585.
45. Id. at 435-36, 545 S.E.2d at 585.
46. 34 Va. App. 217, 539 S.E.2d 742 (Ct. App. 2001), affd, 35 Va. App. 572, 546 S.E.2d
748 (Ct. App. 2001) (en banc).
47. Id. at 223, 539 S.E.2d at 745.
48. Id.
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peals of Virginia ruled in Duong v. Commonwealth49 that a defen-
dant may collaterally attack juvenile convictions utilized and re-
lied on as prior convictions in the sentencing guidelines if they
were secured without notice to a parent in violation of Baker.5"
Although these convictions are not made void by the collateral at-
tack, a court must nonetheless disregard them during the sen-
tencing phase.5' Similarly, in Langhorne v. Commonwealth,52 the
court of appeals held that a defendant's guilty plea following a
transfer of his case from the juvenile court to the circuit court did
not negate the dispositive effect of Baker.53
Three unpublished decisions of the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia54 addressed the interplay between Virginia Code section
16.1-269.1(E) 5 and the Supreme Court of Virginia's recent deci-
sion in Moore v. Commonwealth.56 Virginia Code section 16.1-
269.1(E) provides, in part, that for any offense committed on or
after July 1, 1996, "[a]n indictment in the circuit court cures any
error or defect in any proceeding held in the juvenile court except
with respect to the juvenile's age."57 In Moore, the supreme court
recognized that defects had existed in the juvenile proceeding
against the defendant due to "[t]he Commonwealth's failure to
notify the defendant's biological father of the initiation of juvenile
court proceedings."" The court held, however, that since these de-
fects had occurred after July 1, 1996, they were cured, pursuant
to Virginia Code section 16.1-269(E), by the return of an indict-
ment against the defendant.59 The court of appeals' decisions in-
terpreting Moore each dealt with a juvenile proceeding in which it
was alleged that a defect in the juvenile proceeding deprived the
49. 34 Va. App. 424, 542 S.E.2d 47 (Ct. App. 2001).
50. Id. at 424-29, 542 S.E.2d at 48-49.
5L Id.
52. 35 Va. App. 19, 542 S.E.2d 780 (Ct. App. 2001).
53. Id. at 25, 542 S.E.2d at 782.
54. See McDonald v. Commonwealth, No. 0679-99-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 384 (Ct.
App. May 16, 2000) (unpublished decision); Adams v. Commonwealth, No. 0641-99-2, 2000
Va. App. LEXIS 382 (Ct. App. May 16, 2000) (unpublished decision); Monteon v. Com-
monwealth, No. 2038-99-3, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 316 (Ct. App. May 2, 2000) (unpublished
decision).
55. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1(E) (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
56. 259 Va. 405, 527 S.E.2d 415 (2000).
57. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1(E) (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
58. Moore, 259 Va. at 410, 527 S.E.2d at 418.
59. Id.
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circuit court of jurisdiction. ° In each case the court of appeals
concluded that the Moore holding, and the clear language of Vir-
ginia Code section 16.1-269(E), cured any jurisdictional defects.6'
In Phillips v. Commonwealth," the court of appeals added a
new dimension to Baker. In Phillips, notice was given to a juve-
nile defendant's mother and stepfather at the time of the juvenile
proceeding. However, the stepfather had never adopted the
youth.64 The court of appeals held that the defendant's motion for
a new trial should have been granted in light of Baker since no
notice was given to the youth's biological father. 5 In yet another
unpublished decision, the court of appeals held that failure to
give notice to a father whose address was listed as "unknown" did
not satisfy the statutory exception66 for the father's identity not
being "reasonably ascertainable."67 Note that the key distinction
between the Whitney and Phillips cases and the McDonald, Ad-
ams, and Monteon cases is that the offense in Whitney and Phil-
lips occurred prior to July 1, 1996. It seems clear that it will be
significantly more difficult for juvenile defendants to have their
convictions overturned if such a conviction involves a crime com-
mitted after July 1, 1996.
At least three recent circuit court opinions have dealt with the
issue of parental notification in juvenile proceedings. In Com-
monwealth v. Bryant,61 the Fairfax Circuit Court held that notifi-
cation of only one of the defendant's parents was proper even in
light of Baker.69 The court reasoned that because the underlying
offense had occurred in 1976 and the then-applicable statute re-
60. See McDonald v. Commonwealth, No. 0679-99-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 384, at *2
(Ct. App. May 16, 2000) (unpublished decision); Adams v. Commonwealth, No. 0641-99-2,
2000 Va. App. LEXIS 382, at *1-2 (Ct. App. May 16, 2000) (unpublished decision); Mon-
teon v. Commonwealth, No. 2038-99-3, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 316, at *2-3 (Ct. App. May 2,
2000) (unpublished decision).
61. See McDonald, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 384, at *2-3; Adams, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS
382, at *2-3; Monteon, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 316, at *4-6.
62. No. 2938-99-1, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 101 (Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2001) (unpublished de-
cision).
63. Id. at *2.
64. Id. at *3.
65. Id. at *13.
66. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-263(E) (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
67. See Whitney v. Commonwealth, No. 0835-00-1, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 228, at *3
(Ct. App. May 1, 2001) (unpublished decision).
68. 51 Va. Cir. 143 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Fairfax County).
69. Id. at 145.
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quired notification of only one parent, the Commonwealth had
satisfied the notification requirement.° In another case, the Nor-
folk Circuit Court ruled that an affidavit, given almost ten years
after the original court proceeding, could not be used to impeach a
recital in a juvenile court transfer order that there was "proper
notice to the juvenile and the juvenile's parents."7' Finally, in
Commonwealth v. Cano,72 the Fairfax Circuit Court granted de-
fendant's motion to set aside his guilty pleas to three felonies."
The court reasoned that because the identity of the defendant's
father was ascertainable and notification was not provided, the
trial court did not have jurisdiction under Baker to accept the de-
fendant's guilty pleas. 4
In Parsons v. Commonwealth," the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia ruled that the trial court erred in excluding as hearsay a de-
fendant's testimony regarding statements made by the juvenile
judge who convicted him in 1994.6 According to the defendant's
proffer, the juvenile judge had told the defendant that when he
reached eighteen, all records of his adjudication would be ex-
punged; the defendant allegedly relied on this statement in fail-
ing to list the juvenile adjudication when he attempted to pur-
chase a firearm.77 Similarly, the use of two 1994 juvenile felony
adjudications to support a charge of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon did not amount to an ex post facto application of
the law in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights.78
Although apparently not a juvenile, a defendant high school
student was properly convicted of assault and battery for shining
a laser light at the eyes of a law enforcement officer in a high
school.79 In another case, the court of appeals ruled that no error
was committed by the admission of rebuttal evidence during the
sentencing phase of a trial about a defendant's behavior on the
70. See id.
71. See Commonwealth v. Leavell, 52 Va. Cir. 214, 215 (Cir. Ct. 2000) (Norfolk City).
72. 52 Va. Cir. 223 (Cir. Ct. 2000) (Fairfax County).
73. Id. at 223, 225.
74. See id. at 224-25.
75. 32 Va. App. 576, 529 S.E.2d 810 (Ct. App. 2000).
76. Id. at 580, 529 S.E.2d at 812.
77. Id.
78. See Griffin v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 413, 427-28, 533 S.E.2d 653, 659-60
(Ct. App. 2000).
79. See Adams v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 463, 467-69, 534 S.E.2d 347, 350-52
(Ct. App. 2000).
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four occasions he was detained at a juvenile detention center."
Likewise, a juvenile's statutory right to release from detention af-
ter twenty-one days did not apply where he was in jail after a pre-
liminary hearing and the juvenile court had certified the charge
to the grand jury for trial as an adult."
In Pannell v. Commonwealth,2 both the juvenile court and the
circuit court on appeal found Pannell guilty of violating his condi-
tions of probation and committed him to the Department of Juve-
nile Justice." The court of appeals found a violation of Virginia
Code section 16.1-29184 in the use of hearsay evidence during the
probation revocation hearing and the application of a "preponder-
ance of the evidence" standard of proof.8 5 The Virginia Code re-
quired that such proceedings "be governed by the procedures,
safeguards, rights and duties applicable to the original proceed-
ings. " " The effect of the Pannell decision was short-lived, how-
ever, as the General Assembly deleted the quoted language from
section 16.1-291 at its 2001 session. 7
In Salvatierra v. City of Falls Church,"8 the court of appeals
ruled that a juvenile parole or probation violation, on its own,
does not constitute a felony or a class 1 misdemeanor so as to al-
low for commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice. 9 The
decision would also seem to apply to detention decisions that are
predicated primarily on the commission of a "felony or class 1
misdemeanor.""
Two cases demonstrate the court of appeals' continued refusal
to overturn convictions based on confessions obtained under ques-
80. See Pughsley v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 640, 644, 536 S.E.2d 447, 449 (Ct.
App. 2000).
81. See Williams v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 725, 728, 536 S.E.2d 916, 918 (Ct.
App. 2000).
82. 34 Va. App. 287, 540 S.E.2d 527 (Ct. App. 2001), affd, on reh'g en banc 35 Va.
App. 643, 547 S.E.2d 529 (Ct. App. 2001).
83. Id. at 289, 540 S.E.2d at 528.
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-291 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
85. Pannell, 34 Va. App. at 293, 540 S.E.2d at 531.
86. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-291 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
87. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-291 (Cum. Supp. 2001). The amendment became effec-
tive July 1, 2001.
88. 35 Va. App. 453, 546 S.E.2d 214 (Ct. App. 2001).
89. Id. at 458, 546 S.E.2d at 216.
90. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-248. 1(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
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tionable circumstances. In Potts v. Commonwealth,9 the seven-
teen year old defendant was arrested and interrogated about a
murder that had occurred several weeks earlier.92 Shortly after
being advised of his Miranda rights, Potts requested a lawyer and
indicated he wanted to contact his mother, but the officer denied
the defendant's request to contact his mother and told Potts that
he would get a lawyer "when you get one."93 Potts continued to
press his desire for a lawyer, and the detective put him off fur-
ther. 4 Finally, the defendant agreed to talk." The court con-
cluded that he had waived his right to an attorney, and the de-
fendant's motion to suppress the statement was properly denied.96
In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals held that even
though the defendant was a juvenile during his contact with a po-
lice officer, he was not entitled to a Miranda warning prior to the
commencement of a formal custodial interrogation. Further,
there was no absolute requirement for an attorney or guardian ad
litem to be present prior to the discussion leading to a confession
by defendant.9"
In four other unpublished court of appeals decisions, the court
ruled: (1) it was proper to amend a conspiracy indictment to ex-
clude all periods of time when defendant was a juvenile and thus
avoid any jurisdictional issues;99 (2) a trial court properly consid-
ered sentencing guidelines evaluations that considered a defen-
dant's juvenile adjudications;' (3) a defendant did not properly
91. 35 Va. App. 485, 546 S.E.2d 229 (Ct. App. 2001).
92. Id. at 490, 546 S.E.2d at 231.
93. Id. at 490, 546 S.E.2d at 231-32.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 491, 546 S.E.2d at 232.
96. Id. at 496, 546 S.E.2d at 234. A White Paper issued this year by the American Bar
Association Criminal Justice Section Task Force on Youth in the Criminal Justice System
recommended very close scrutiny of confessions by juveniles. See TASKFORCE ON YOUTH IN
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, AMERIcAN BAR ASSOCIATION CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION,
YOUTH IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: GUIDELINES FOR POLICYMAKERS AND
PRACTITIONERS 9 (2001). Judge Benton wrote a strong dissent addressing many of the con-
ceras articulated in the White Paper. Potts, 35 Va. App. at 498-505, 546 S.E.2d at 235-39
(Benton, J., dissenting).
97. See Sneade v. Commonwealth, No. 1105-99-2, 2000 WL 1486567 (Va. Ct. App. Oct.
10, 2000) (unpublished decision).
98. See id. at 2 n.2.
99. Crawford v. Commonwealth, No. 1844-99-3, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 367, at *:4 (Ct.
App. May 16, 2000) (unpublished decision).
100. Jackson v. Commonwealth, No. 0388-99-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 398, at *14 (Ct.
App. May 23, 2000) (unpublished decision).
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preserve for appeal his claim of constitutional error in the trial
court's denial of his attempt to impeach a witness with his juve-
nile felonies;'' and (4) the fact that the original juvenile petition
charged a youth with possession of a specific firearm did not pre-
clude indictment for possession of a "firearm" or his conviction for
possessing a shotgun since the description of the firearm in the
juvenile petition was excess language.0 2
In Peace v. Commonwealth, °3 the court of appeals held that
even though the evidence established that a mother was aware
that her son and his friends were at her home smoking mari-
juana, her refusal to act more forcefully to prevent the illegal act
did not amount to a willful omission to act.10
4
In Penry v. Johnson, °5 the United States Supreme Court ruled,
for the second time in Penry's case,0 6 that the trial court had not
adequately instructed the jury during the sentencing phase of his
second capital trial about the mitigating effect of his mental re-
tardation and history of abuse when he was a child.0 7
III. ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER CARE, AND TERMINATION OF
RESIDUAL PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. Legislative Developments
Legislation adopted in 2001 addressing the protection of chil-
dren provides that a "child-placing agency may approve as an
adoptive parent an applicant convicted of not more than one mis-
demeanor [simple assault conviction] not involving abuse, neglect
or moral turpitude, provided ten years have elapsed following
conviction."' Further, the Commissioner of the Department of
101. Boyce v. Commonwealth, No. 1463-99-4, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 477, at *4 (Ct. App.
June 27, 2000) (unpublished decision).
102. Toliver v. Commonwealth, No. 2880-99-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 716, at *3 (Ct.
App. Nov. 7, 2000) (unpublished decision).
103. No. 2651-99-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 725 (Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2000) (unpublished
decision).
104. Id. at *5-10.
105. 121 S. Ct. 1910 (2001) [hereinafter Penry Il].
106. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
107. Penry II, 121 S. Ct. at 1924.
108. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-198.1 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
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Social Services ("DSS") may grant a waiver to an applicant for li-
censure or registration of a family day home even if another adult
living in the home has been convicted of misdemeanor simple or
domestic assault so long as five years have elapsed following the
conviction and the department has conducted a home study. °9
Further legislation provides that the chief judge of each juve-
nile and domestic relations district court may provide for an al-
ternative means of copying and distributing Court Appointed
Special Advocate reports."0 An important new Virginia Code sec-
tion allows a juvenile and domestic relations district court to is-
sue an order to the Department of Corrections to deliver a pris-
oner who is a witness in an action to the sheriffs office in the
jurisdiction of the court issuing the order."' This section partially
overrules Commonwealth ex rel. Virginia Department of Correc-
tions v. Brown,"2 which held that general district courts did not
have the statutory authority to issue transportation orders for
prisoners confined within a state correctional facility."3 The bill
also provides for the taking of a prisoner's testimony by telephone
in certain cases." 4 It also requires the party seeking the testi-
mony to pay for the transportation costs when the court requires
the presence of the prisoner."' For juvenile courts, the amend-
ment specifically addresses: proceedings under Virginia Code Sec-
tion 16.1-241(A) (2), (4), or (5) (dependency, entrustment, or ter-
mination cases); relinquishment hearings pursuant to Section
16.1-241(K) of the Code; and foster care plan, foster care review,
and permanency planning hearings."
6
Another amendment makes clear that current law regarding
109. See id. § 63.1-198.4 (Cum. Supp. 2001). The waiver shall not be granted if the
adult living in the home is an assistant or substitute provider or if convicted of both simple
assault or assault and battery and domestic assault. Id.
110. Id. § 16.1-274 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
111. Id. § 16.1-276.2 (Cum. Supp. 2001). Under prior law, the Department of Correc-
tions was to deliver witnesses in circuit court actions, but the statute did not specify where
the prisoner was to be delivered. See VA. CODE. ANN. § 8.01410 (Repl. Vol. 1999),
amended by VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-410 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
112. 259 Va. 697, 529 S.E.2d 96 (2000).
113. Id. at 705, 529 S.E.2d at 100.
114. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-93.1, -276.3, 17.1-513.2 (Cum. Supp. 2001) (providing
for the use of telephonic, electronic video, and audio communication systems in the district
courts, juvenile and domestic relations courts, and circuit courts, respectively).
115. See id. § 8.01-410, 16.1-276.2 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
116. See id. § 16.1-276.2 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
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testimony in cases involving child victims includes child wit-
nesses and adds murder to the list of offenses that these sections
cover.11 Another significant piece of legislation provides that,
upon a victim's request, the attorney for the Commonwealth must
consult with the victim throughout the plea negotiation proc-
ess. 118 Except for good cause, the court is not allowed to accept a
plea agreement unless it finds that the Commonwealth has done
so." 9 The duty to confer with the victim, however, does not limit
the ability of the attorney for the Commonwealth to exercise his
discretion with respect to the handling of any criminal charge
against the defendant. 2 °
Other legislation makes clear that teachers, principals, or other
persons "employed by a school board or employed in a school op-
erated by the Commonwealth" are prohibited from subjecting a
student to corporal punishment.'2 ' The bill provides, however,
that the definitions of "corporal punishment" or "abused or ne-
glected child" do not include permitted actions described in the
corporal punishment statute. 122
Various criminal code amendments rewrote the "indecent liber-
ties with children" statute'23 to clarify that, except for the portion
on receiving remuneration for encouraging a child to perform in
sexually explicit visual material, the child must be under four-
teen years of age to constitute a crime.124 Another bill sets forth
117. See id. § 18.2-67.9 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
118. See id. § 19.2-11.01 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
119. Id. § 19.2-11.01(A)(4)(d) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
120. Id.
121. See id. § 63.1-248.4:1 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
122. See id. The legislation largely parallels the provisions of Virginia Code section
22.1-279.1 prohibiting the use of corporal punishment in school settings. See VA. CODE
ANN. § 22.1-279.1 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2001). In determining whether a person
acts within the exceptions in the section, the local department of social services shall ex-
amine whether the actions at the time of the event were reasonable. See id. § 63.1-
248.4:1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
123. Id. § 18.2-370 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
124. Id. The bill further provides that a second or subsequent violation of the Virginia
Code section prohibiting taking indecent liberties with a child by a person in custodial or
supervisory relationship is a Class 5 felony. Id. § 18.2-370.1 (Cum. Supp. 2001). Also, a
first offense under the taking indecent liberties with children sections is defined as a
sexually violent offense. Id. § 19.2-298.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001). Under previous law the
offense was not defined as sexually violent until the second offense. See id. § 19.2-298.1(A)
(Repl. Vol. 2000). This means that a person has to register with the Sexual Offender and
Crimes Against Minors Registry after a first offense rather than a second offense. The bill
also elevates the penalty for knowingly failing to register or re-register or knowingly pro-
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civil penalties for persons providing harmful material to minors
who appear to be under eighteen years of age without first requir-
ing the production of a government-issued photo identification.
125
A third enactment requires the State Police to furnish an affida-
vit to the jurisdiction prosecuting a person for the failure to com-
ply with the duty to register or re-register as a sexually violent
offender.'26 The affidavit shall be admitted in court as proof of the
failure to register, and will therefore alleviate the need for the
custodian of the records at the State Police to testify as to the re-
cord. 2
7
Amendments to the statutes governing the Criminal Injuries
Compensation Fund provide that a person who suffered sexual
abuse as a minor has until ten years after his or her eighteenth
birthday to file a claim.12 The bill also provides that any claim
involving the sexual abuse of a minor that has been denied before
July 1, 2001, because it was not timely filed, may, upon applica-
tion filed with the Compensation Fund, be reconsidered provided
the application for reconsideration is filed within ten years after
the minor's eighteenth birthday. 2
9
B. Case Law
It has been commonplace to find that many of the appellate
cases on the criminal side of the docket each year involve issues
of abuse or neglect. For example, in Collado v. Commonwealth,8 °
the evidence was deemed sufficient to support the defendant's
conviction for child abuse through the "shaken baby syndrome" in
light of both her custody of the child as a daycare provider when
the injuries occurred and her expert testimony regarding the time
of the injuries.'' During the sentencing phase of the trial, the
trial court might have erred in admitting into evidence a letter
viding false information from a Class 1 misdemeanor to a Class 6 felony. See id. § 18.2-
472.1 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
125. See id. § 18.2-391(E) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
126. Id. § 19.2-298.1(H) (Cum. Supp. 2001). The affidavit must be provided to the regis-
trant or his counsel seven days before a hearing. Id. § 18.2-472.1 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
127. Id. § 18.2-472.1 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
128. Id. § 19.2-368.5(B) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
129. See id. § 19.2-368.8(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
130. 33 Va. App. 356, 533 S.E.2d 625 (Ct. App. 2000).
13. Id. at 363, 533 S.E.2d at 629.
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from a couple indicating that their child had suffered a similar in-
jury while in Collado's care." 2 The trial court also considered
positive letters from other parents, however, and the judge stated
that he would not sentence the defendant based on the negative
letter.
33
In Craig v. Commonwealth,3 4 the court held that a defendant
could properly be convicted of involuntary manslaughter in a trial
for second degree murder for the death of his daughter as the re-
sult of "shaken baby syndrome."'35 This is because the Common-
wealth, as well as the defendant, may request an instruction on
the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter in such a
case.
136
In Dowden v. Commonwealth,3" another case involving a par-
ent, the circumstantial evidence that defendant was responsible
for the blunt trauma fatal injuries to his seven-month-old son was
sufficient to support his conviction for involuntary manslaugh-
ter. 38 However, in Barrett v. Commonwealth,'39 a mother ap-
pealed her convictions for felony murder and felony child neglect
for failing to adequately supervise her almost three-year-old
daughter who drowned her ten-month-old brother. 4 ° The court of
appeals reversed the trial court because of the trial court's refusal
to instruct the jury on the meaning of "willful" in the context of
felony abuse or neglect.141
In Velazquez v. Commonwealth,'42 the court of appeals affirmed
the defendant's conviction for the rape of a fifteen-year-old. 43 The
court ruled that the trial court properly admitted testimony by a
132. See id. at 367, 533 S.E.2d at 630-31.
133. Id.
134. 34 Va. App. 155, 538 S.E.2d 355 (Ct. App. 2000).
135. Id. at 166, 538 S.E.2d at 360.
136. Id. at 161-62, 538 S.E.2d at 358-59.
137. 260 Va. 459, 536 S.E.2d 437 (2000).
138. Id. at 468, 536 S.E.2d at 442. The only other possible explanation for the injuries
was the administration of CPR during efforts to resuscitate the infant, but the expert evi-
dence negating that theory was overwhelming. Id. at 468-70, 536 S.E.2d at 442.
139. 32 Va. App. 693, 530 S.E.2d 437 (Ct. App. 2000).
140. Id. at 697, 530 S.E.2d at 439.
141. Id. at 699, 530 S.E.2d at 440.
142. 35 Va. App. 189, 543 S.E.2d 631 (Ct. App. 2001).
143. Id. at 202, 543 S.E.2d at 638.
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sexual assault nurse examiner ("SANE") as an expert witness
concerning the cause of the victim's injuries.' In another case, a
defendant neglected to proffer evidence of an eleven-year-old sod-
omy victim's disciplinary problems in school.145 The defendant
was denied review of the trial court's ruling excluding the evi-
dence.146 In Bloom v. Commonwealth,'47 the evidence was suffi-
cient to support defendant's convictions for attempting to take in-
decent liberties with a child under the age of fourteen and for
solicitation to commit sodomy in various Internet communica-
tions.'8
In Snow v. Commonwealth,'49 the court of appeals held that an
uncle could be convicted of child cruelty as a "person responsible
for the care of a child" by engaging in a high speed attempt to
evade the police with several children under eighteen in his car. 5 °
The conviction was sustained because he voluntarily took control
of the car and drove away from the police knowing that the chil-
dren were in the vehicle.' 5' Likewise, in Quinones v. Common-
wealth,'52 the court held that a step-grandfather could be tried as
a custodian.'53 His conviction was reversed, however, because of
the erroneous introduction of prior bad acts testimony lacking
any connection to the charged incidents.'54
In Paris v. Commonwealth,'55 the court of appeals concluded
that the statute under which a defendant was convicted for com-
mitting oral sodomy on his fifteen-year-old nephew was clearly
constitutional'56 and did not violate his rights to "'the enjoyment
144. Id. at 195-97, 543 S.E.2d at 634-35.
145. Lockhart v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 329, 340, 542 S.E.2d 1, 6 (Ct. App. 2001).
Despite some inconsistencies and lack of corroboration in the victim's testimony, his evi-
dence was not unworthy of belief and did not render the evidence insufficient to convict.
Id. at 342, 542 S.E.2d at 7.
146. Id. at 340, 542 S.E.2d at 6.
147. 34 Va. App. 364, 542 S.E.2d 18 (Ct. App. 2001).
148. Id. at 372-73, 542 S.E.2d at 22.
149. 33 Va. App. 766, 537 S.E.2d 6 (Ct. App. 2000).
150. Id. at 773, 537 S.E.2d at 10 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.1 (Repl. Vol. 1996
& Cum. Supp. 2001)).
151. Id. at 771-72, 537 S.E.2d at 9.
152. 35 Va. App. 634, 547 S.E.2d 524 (Ct. App. 2001).
153. Id. at 636, 547 S.E.2d at 525.
154. Id. at 639-43, 547 S.E.2d at 527-29.
155. 35 Va. App. 377, 545 S.E.2d 557 (Ct. App. 2001).
156. The law in question was Virginia's "Crimes against nature" statute. See VA. CODE
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of life and liberty" and to "'pursuing and obtaining happiness.'"157
In addition, the court held that the trial judge did not err in re-
fusing a jury instruction that the Commonwealth had to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that the vic-
tim did not consent.
158
In Cairns v. Commonwealth,'59 a defendant was convicted of
multiple offenses involving sexual conduct with his daughter and
step-daughter.16 The defendant's wife allegedly filmed, and en-
gaged in, the sexual acts between the defendant, daughter, and
step-daughter.'6 ' Because the wife did not testify against Cairns,
there was no violation of the marital privilege through the intro-
duction of her pretrial statements; hence, the admission of those
statements did not violate the hearsay rule."'62 However, the ad-
mission of the wife's statements in the joint trial violated the
husband's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights, and
the erroneous admission of the evidence was not harmless er-
ror.
63
In Ashby v. Commonwealth,64 the court of appeals concluded
that when the original indictment was "nol prossed" and a new
indictment issued, the speedy trial period began anew.165 More-
over, the victim's testimony was sufficient to support the convic-
tions for sexual offenses even though he was a fourteen-year-old
special education student who told no one about the incidents un-
til well after they occurred.166 In Moyer v. Commonwealth,'67 the
court of appeals allowed a boarding school teacher's diaries into
evidence and found the teacher guilty of taking indecent liberties
with a minor child. 61 In Griffin v. Commonwealth,'69 the court
concluded that although the defendant had confessed to sexual of-
ANN. § 18.2-361(A) (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
157. Paris, 35 Va. App. at 381, 545 S.E.2d at 558 (quoting VA. CONST. art. I, § 1).
158. Id. at 385, 545 S.E.2d at 561.
159. 35 Va. App. 1, 542 S.E.2d 771 (Ct. App. 2001).
160. Id. at 6, 542 S.E.2d at 773.
161. Id. at 11-12, 542 S.E.2d at 776.
162. Id. at 10-12, 542 S.E.2d at 776.
163. See id. at 12-18, 542 S.E.2d at 776-79.
164. 33 Va. App. 540, 535 S.E.2d 182 (Ct. App. 2000).
165. Id. at 549, 535 S.E.2d at 187.
166. Id. at 544-48, 535 S.E.2d at 185-86.
167. 33 Va. App. 8, 531 S.E.2d 580 (Ct. App. 2000) (en banc).
168. Id. at 36-37, 531 S.E.2d at 594.
169. 33 Va. App. 413, 533 S.E.2d 653 (Ct. App. 2000).
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fenses against his six-year-old daughter, there was not even
"slight corroborative evidence" to establish the corpus delicti of
the offense and justify the conviction.'" In two cases brought by a
Virginia prison inmate who had been convicted for sexual crimes
involving juveniles, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia ruled that correctional authorities
could confiscate photographs of children from inmates' cells be-
cause incarcerated individuals have "no recognizable expectation
of privacy" in their cells.'7 '
In Green v. Richmond Department of Social Services,72 the
Court of Appeals of Virginia held that allowing an individual, in-
carcerated for several sexual offenses, access to his daughter's
medical, hospital and other records "would be harmful to her and
was not in her best interests.""3 In Rivera v. Roanoke City De-
partment of Social Services,' the court of appeals ruled that the
trial court properly granted an emergency removal order when
Rivera failed to control the behavior of her two grandsons in her
custody.' 5 The boys had a history of delinquency, and Rivera had
a history of failing to maintain their home detention status.'76
Rivera also failed to cooperate with DSS's attempts to provide her
with counseling, homemaking, and parenting services. '
Substance abuse continues to play a major role in the termina-
tion of residual parental rights. In Hawthorne v. Smyth County
Department of Social Services,' the Hawthornes' son was re-
moved from their care in 1997 because of inadequate parenting
skills, including, among other things, neglect, serious alcohol
abuse, and general instability in the home.' 9 The son remained
in foster care for several months.' Finally, he went to live with a
grown sister and brother-in-law before returning home later that
170. Id. at 430, 533 S.E.2d at 661.
171. Ballance v. Virginia, 130 F. Supp. 2d 754, 761 (W.D. Va. 2000); Ballance v. Young,
130 F. Supp. 2d 762, 769 (W.D. Va. 2000).
172. 35 Va. App. 682, 547 S.E.2d 548 (Ct. App. 2001).
173. Id. at 686, 547 S.E.2d at 550.
174. No. 0727-00-3, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 490 (Ct. App. July 5, 2000) (unpublished de-
cision).
175. Id. at *4.
176. Id. at *5.
177. Id.
178. 33 Va. App. 130, 531 S.E.2d 639 (Ct. App. 2000).
179. Id. at 132, 531 S.E.2d at 641.
180. Id.
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year under departmental custody.' A foster care plan was pre-
pared and approved, but the parents failed to comply with its
provisions and continued to abuse alcohol.8 2 Consequently, DSS
removed the child from the Hawthornes' home.8 3 Despite the
trial court's error in ruling that the department had no duty to
seek placement with a relative before terminating parental
rights, the Court of Appeals of Virginia ruled that the error was
harmless and terminated the parental rights."8
In another case, a father's parental rights were terminated
where the neglected child had special needs resulting from the fa-
ther's incarceration, involvement with cocaine, and failure to fol-
low the prescribed conditions for the child's return.'85 In Walker v.
Virginia Beach Department of Social Services,' the Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia terminated a father's parental rights because of
his failure to remedy the neglect and domestic violence that led to
the removal of the child from his home.8 7 In Walker, the father
was a military veteran suffering from post-traumatic stress dis-
order and "polysubstance dependence."'8 8 He was in and out of
the hospital during much of the time his daughter was in foster
care, and he was not successful in dealing with his problems or in
complying with the terms of the foster care service plan.8 9 In
Roanoke City Department of Social Services v. Heide,9 ' however,
the court of appeals ruled that the circuit court properly refused
to terminate a father's parental rights despite a history of alcohol
abuse.' 9 ' In Heide, the father made substantial progress in deal-
ing with his abuse to the extent that he had not had a drink in
more than a year and had an improved employment record.' 92




184. Id. at 140, 531 S.E.2d at 644.
185. See Turner v. Fredericksburg Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 2532-00-2, 2001 Va. App.
LEXIS 163 (Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2001) (unpublished decision).
186. No. 0505-00-1, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 825 (Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000) (unpublished
decision).
187. Id. at *9.
188. Id. at *6.
189. Id.
190. 35 Va. App. 328, 544 S.E.2d 890 (Ct. App. 2001).
191. Id. at 330, 544 S.E.2d at 890.
192. Id. at 333-34, 544 S.E.2d at 892.
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stance abuse will play a major role in a court's determination of
whether to terminate parental rights.
As in Walker, the mental illness or mental deficiency of a par-
ent, when combined with substance abuse, may also play a role in
the termination of a parent's rights. In Richmond Department of
Social Services v. L.P.,"' the court of appeals reversed the circuit
court's conclusion that the mother's parental rights could not be
terminated because her inability to properly care for her child
was due solely to her mental deficiency, thereby constituting
"good cause."194 Stating that the guiding principle in termination
cases is "the best interests of the child," the courts of appeals held
that the severity of the mother's mental deficiency precluded her
from ever being "able to assume responsibility for the care of her
child."'95 The court concluded that:
[A] parent's mental deficiency that is of such severity that there is no
reasonable expectation that such parent will be able within a rea-
sonable period of time befitting the child's best interests to under-
take responsibility for the care needed by the child in accordance
with the child's age and stage of development does not constitute
"good cause" under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2).
A third category of persistent termination cases involves incar-
cerated parents. In Howard v. Charlottesville Department of So-
cial Services,'97 the court found clear and convincing evidence to
terminate Howard's residual parental rights where she repeat-
edly gave up custody of her daughter to others without maintain-
ing contact with either the girl or the custodians.'98 Howard was
either a fugitive or incarcerated during much of the child's life
and did not follow through on the treatment programs prescribed
by the foster care plan.'99 However, in Fairfax County Department
of Social Services v. Ibrahim,00 the court refused to terminate
Ibrahim's parental rights because DSS's evidence was insufficient
193. 35 Va. App. 573, 546 S.E.2d 749 (Ct. App. 2001).
194. Id. at 579-80, 546 S.E.2d at 752.
195. Id. at 585, 546 S.E.2d at 755.
196. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(C)(2) (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2001)).
197. No. 1275-99-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 364 (Ct. App. May 16, 2000) (unpublished
decision).
198. Id. at *2-6.
199. Id.
200. No. 0821-00-4, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 824 (Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000) (unpublished
decision).
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to sever his bond with his children.2"' Ibrahim's children were
placed in foster care as a result of abuse by a substitute custodian
while Ibrahim, a foreign national, was incarcerated in a federal
penitentiary for a drug offense.2 2 DSS never returned the chil-
dren to the family because the father was deported upon his re-
lease.0 3 The court found that the statutory requirements for ter-
mination were not met because services were not provided to
assist in reuniting the family.2 4 On the other hand, in Jones v.
Richmond Department of Social Services, °5 the court upheld the
juvenile and domestic relations court's termination of the
mother's parental rights in light of evidence that the mother was
incarcerated four times, continuously resumed her substance
abuse, and repeatedly failed to comply with the instructions of ei-
ther DSS or the court.2 6 Also, in Lefler v. Smyth County Depart-
ment of Social Services, °7 a mother's parental rights were termi-
nated after a long history of physical altercations between the
parents, a history of neglect of the children and their persistent
physical, behavioral, and emotional problems, and a history of
regular incarceration of the mother on a variety of criminal
charges. 08
In another case, a father's parental rights were terminated
while he was serving a fifty-seven year sentence.20 9 There were no
relatives capable or willing to care for his son who had been in
foster care with prospective adoptive parents for more than four
years.210
In Fredericksburg Department of Social Services v. Brown,21'
201. Id. at *11.
202. Id. at *3.
203. Id. at *8.
204. Id. at *6-7. Judge Clement concurred, but expressed concern that little focus had
been placed on the best interests and needs of the children in the majority opinion. Id. at
*12-15 (Clement, J., concurring).
205. No. 2110-00-2, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 63 (Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2001) (unpublished
decision).
206. Id. at *6.
207. No. 2706-00-3, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 250 (Ct. App. May 8, 2001) (unpublished de-
cision).
208. Id. at *3-5.
209. See Carton v. Richmond Dept. of Soc. Servs., No. 0036-01-2, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS
243, at *3 (Ct. App. May 8, 2001) (unpublished decision).
210. Id.
211. 33 Va. App. 313, 533 S.E.2d 12 (Ct. App. 2000).
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the Court of Appeals of Virginia found an entrustment agreement
executed by the children's aunt invalid, even though the aunt had
legal custody of the children.212 Because the aunt was neither a
"parent" nor a "guardian" as required by Virginia Code section
63.1-56, the court denied the termination of residual parental
rights but could not grant custody of the children to DSS.213 Other
parents had their rights to their son terminated where there were
various allegations of abuse, where the mother absconded with
the boy and could not be located for almost two years, where the
child had such severe behavioral problems that he had to be
placed in therapeutic foster care, and where the parents had little
involvement with their son after his return to foster care.214
One termination case involved a family with a long history of
interaction with DSS, commencing with a finding of neglect in
1993, which resulted in the award of custody to the paternal
grandparents.1 5 In September of 1994, the children were re-
moved through an emergency removal order, and in October of
1994, DSS drafted a foster care plan with the goal of returning
the children to the parents.21 6 A year later, a new foster care plan
was filed with a new goal of adoption.217 The parents could not
meet the plan's requirements, and as such, the decision to termi-
nate parental rights was clearly supported by the evidence.218 In
Miller v. Richmond Department of Social Services,1 9 Miller's chil-
dren had been in foster care for more than five years, and, during
220that time, Miller had visited them only seven times. While one
of the boys had special needs, Miller did little to participate in the
services offered by DSS.221 Thus, the evidence supported the ter-
mination of his parental rights.2 22 Failure to follow through with a
212. Id. at 323, 533 S.E.2d at 17.
213. Id. at 323, 533 S.E.2d at 16.
214. See Beardslee v. Dep't ofSoc. Servs., No. 2721-00-2, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 175, at
*9 (Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2001) (unpublished decision).
215. See Reid v. Loudoun Co. Dep't ofSoc. Servs., No. 3074-99-4, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS
515 (Ct. App. July 18, 2000) (unpublished decision).
216. Id. at *4.
217. Id. at *5.
218. Id. at*:'13.
219. No. 0320-00-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 541 (Ct. App. July 25, 2000) (unpublished
decision).
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foster care plan resulted in the termination of parental rights in
Fayette v. Stafford County Department of Social Services.22 3 In
Fayette, the father failed to comply with a foster care plan calling
for extensive visitation: he attended only sixteen of the fifty-six
potential visits, never attended the prescribed parenting classes,
failed to complete a scheduled parenting evaluation, and incurred
significant child support arrearages.224
In May v. Virginia Beach Department of Social Services,225 the
court concluded there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court
in terminating May's parental rights.226 May's attorney had made
repeated unsuccessful efforts to contact May, and May failed to
stay in touch with her attorney.22 7 The evidence also showed that
May did not respond to repeated efforts by DSS to provide ser-
vices to her, visited her son only twice in foster care between
April 1998 and July 1999, and was unwilling or unable to sub-
stantially remedy the situations that led to her son's foster
care.22 In Harmon v. Richmond County Department of Social
Services,22 9 the court of appeals concluded that the trial court did
not err in quashing subpoenas directed to the defendant's eleven-
year-old twin sons because the boys were not of an age of discre-
tion sufficient to testify and express their opinions about the ter-
mination of their mother's residual parental rights.23 ° However,
where there was no explicit finding that termination was in the
best interest of the children, the court of appeals found error in
concluding that the evidence was sufficient to terminate the
mother's parental rights.23' In another case, the termination of a
mother's parental rights was affirmed when the mother failed to
appear at the de novo hearing in the circuit court.2"2 Also, the
failure of a mother to assert her claim that a contractual agree-
223. No. 1424-99-4, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 604 (Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2000) (unpublished
decision).
224. Id. at *5.
225. No. 0461-00-1, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 847 (Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2000) (unpublished
decision).
226. Id. at *6.
227. Id at *2-3.
228. Id. at *5.
229. No. 0895-00-2, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 74 (Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2001) (unpublished de-
cision).
230. Id. at *2.
231. Id. at *9-10.
232. Arsenault v. Isle of Wight Co. Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 2609-00-1, 2001 Va. App.
LEXIS 290, at *1-3 (Ct. App. May 29, 2001) (per curiam) (unpublished decision).
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ment with the DSS precluded the termination of parental rights
in the circuit court during her de novo appeal barred an appeal to
the court of appeals on that basis.233
Several other Virginia cases were recently decided on proce-
dural grounds. In a custody dispute, the failure of a mother to
serve a copy of her opening appellate brief on the child's guardian
ad litem constituted a failure to bring a necessary party before
the court.234 The mother's appeal was therefore dismissed. 5 In
another case, the court of appeals dismissed a parent's appeal
from the approval of a permanent entrustment agreement and
the termination of parental rights because the parent's counsel
simply endorsed the order as "seen and objected to" without any
specific grounds for objection stated or preserved for appeal.236
Further, DSS failed to preserve any issues for appeal from an or-
der denying termination of parental rights by endorsing the
judgment order as "[wie ask for this."23" Finally, a party failed to
perfect an appeal from a DSS administrative hearing by failing to
make DSS a party in the circuit court proceeding.2 38
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston,239 the Supreme Court of the
United States ruled that a public hospital's non-consensual drug
testing of pregnant women for law enforcement purposes was an
unconstitutional search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.24 °
Pregnant women who obtained obstetrical care at the hospital
were tested for cocaine use, and if the tests were positive, the
women were either arrested or offered drug treatment.24'
A divided Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded, in Bell v.
Jarvis,24 2 that a state court's closure of the courtroom during peti-
233. Swearingin v. Dep't ofSoc. Servs., No. 1798-00-3, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 377, at *6
(Ct. App. June 26, 2001) (unpublished decision).
234. Comer v. Comer, No. 0157-00-2 (Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000) (unpublished decision),
available at httpv/www.courts.state.va.us/vpcau.htm.
235. Id.
236. Keator v. Lutheran Soc. Servs. of the Natl Capital Area, Inc., No. 1883-00-4, 2001
Va. App. LEXIS 37, at *2-3 (Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2001) (unpublished decision).
237. Suffolk Dep't ofSoc. Servs. v. Ellis, No. 1705-00-1, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 129, at *2
(Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2001) (unpublished decision).
238. Somers v. Accomack Co. Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 2899-00-1, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS
291, at *5 (Ct. App. May 29, 2001) (per curiam) (unpublished decision).
239. 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001).
240. Id. at 1293.
241. Id. at 1285.
242. 236 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
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tioner's trial on fifty-eight counts of sexual misconduct with his
step-granddaughter and two of her friends, and the failure of his
state appellate counsel to raise the issue, did not warrant federal
habeas corpus relief.243 Likewise, in Quinn v. Haynes,' the
Fourth Circuit denied habeas corpus review of a state court deci-
sion refusing cross-examination of a child sexual abuse victim re-
garding allegations of sexual assault against others pursuant to a
state rape shield law.245
The Fourth Circuit ruled in United States v. Mento246 that the
Child Pornography Protection Act of 1996"4 was constitutional.24
In a later case the Fourth Circuit concluded that the dissemina-
tion of child pornography in interstate commerce in violation of
the same Act could constitute "distribution," even without a pe-




A number of substantive changes were made to Title 22.1 of the
Virginia Code during the 2001 session of the General Assembly.
The new legislation: (1) adds definitions for the various student
disciplinary actions;2 1 (2) requires division superintendents, in
making recommendations for expulsion for violations other than
those involving weapons or drugs, to consider various factors,
such as the student's age, grade level, academic and attendance
records, disciplinary history, and the appropriateness and avail-
ability of an alternative education placement;2 2 (3) requires sub-
sequent confirmation or disapproval of a recommended student
243. Id. at 175.
244. 234 F.3d 837 (4th Cir. 2000).
245. Id. at 852.
246. 231 F.3d 912 (4th Cir. 2000).
247. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
248. Mento, 231 F.3d at 923.
249. See United States v. Williams, 253 F.3d 789, 795-96 (4th Cir. 2001).
250. Id.
251. See VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-276.01(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
252. Id. § 22.1-277.06(C) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
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expulsion by a school board, or a committee thereof, regardless of
whether the pupil exercised the right to a hearing;253 (4) allows
school boards to exclude from attendance students who have been
suspended for more than thirty days, or expelled by another
school division, or for whom private school admission has been
withdrawn regardless of the offense, upon a finding that the stu-
dent presents a danger to the other students or staff of the school
division and upon compliance with a hearing process; 254 (5) elimi-
nates the one-year cap for the period of time a student may be ex-
cluded from school attendance in another school division, and
provides that the date upon which the student may re-petition for
admission must be issued by the relevant body or person render-
ing the initial exclusion, and, upon denial of the petition, a date
for subsequent petitions;255 (6) permits school divisions excluding
students who have been expelled from another school division in
the Commonwealth to "accept or waive any or all of any condi-
tions for readmission" that may have been imposed by the expel-
ling school division256 with the exception that the excluding school
division cannot impose additional conditions for readmission;2 57
(7) allows school boards to permit students who were expelled,
were excluded, are subject to a long-term suspension, or were
found guilty of a crime that could have resulted in injury to oth-
ers or for whom a court disposition is required to be reported, to
attend an alternative education program provided by the school
division;258 (8) permits school boards to take action against stu-
dents for actual breakage, or destruction of, or failure to return
school property that is caused in the course of a student's stud-
ies;259 and (9) requires school boards to establish a schedule pur-
suant to which expelled students may apply and reapply for re-
admission to school.260
253. Id. § 22.1-277.06(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
254. Id. § 22.1-277.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
255. Id. § 22.1-277.2(C) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
256. Id. § 22.1-277.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
257. Id.
258. Id. § 22.1-277.2:1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
259. Id. § 22.1-280.4 (Cum. Supp. 2001). Prior law required the pupil to reimburse the
school board for property damage. Id. § 22.1-276 (Rep. Vol. 2000). In addition, current
civil procedure statutes limit recovery from parents for willful or malicious destruction of,
or damage to, property by minors to $2,500. Id. § 8.01-43 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
260. Id. § 22.1-277.06(B) (Cum. Supp. 2001). This schedule would be designed to ensure
that the hearing and ruling on any initial petition for readmission, if granted, would en-
2001]
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Other legislation deals with weapons by providing that the
hunting exemption and the exemption for an established shooting
range do not apply to the willful discharge of a firearm upon the
buildings and grounds of a school.26' Another statute prohibits all
knives on school property, or at a school-sponsored event, except
for pocket knives having a folding metal blade less than three
inches long.262 In Frias v. Commonwealth,263 the court of appeals
determined that a "registered armed security officer" who also
has a valid concealed weapons permit is not a "conservator of the
peace" and, thus, can be convicted of possession of a firearm on
school property.264
Another behavior-focused law authorizes local school boards to
establish optional age-appropriate education programs for young
students in grades kindergarten through five who require guid-
ance, supervision, and discipline in a structured learning envi-
ronment.26 5 These programs must provide services that will en-
able students to maintain academic achievement, attain basic
skills and academic proficiencies, and otherwise benefit from a
public education during the time they may be removed from the
regular classroom. 6 School boards must ensure that the pro-
grams are adequately staffed by licensed teachers or other per-
sons with qualifications to implement the program.
26 7
able the student to resume school attendance one calendar year from the date of the ex-
pulsion. Id.
261. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-280(B) (Cum. Supp. 2001). The bill also provides that
there is no established shooting range exemption, although there is a hunting exemption,
for discharge of a firearm on public property within 1,000 feet of the property line of a
school. Id. § 18.2-280(C) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
262. Id. § 18.2-308.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
263. 34 Va. App. 193, 538 S.E.2d 374 (Ct. App. 2000).
264. See id. at 199, 538 S.E.2d at 377. The Attorney General of Virginia also has ex-
pressed the opinion that a person with a valid concealed weapons permit is not entitled to
carry a gun onto school property or a school bus. See Op. to Hon. Robert G. Marshall (Nov.
9, 2000).
265. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-200.1 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
266. Id. The statute further provides:
The programs shall also be designed to accommodate students within the
school building to which they have been assigned, facilitate the efficient tran-
sition of students between the optional education program and their regular
classroom, provide for the continuity of instruction, a nurturing environment,
necessary guidance and supervision, and the participation of the student's
parents in correcting his behavior.
Id.
267. Id.
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Legislation was enacted at the insistence of the Joint Subcom-
mittee to Study Continuing and Vocational/Technical Education.
The legislation changed the name of "vocational technical educa-
tion" in the Virginia Code to "career and technical" education, in
conformance with the currently accepted national view.26 Other
new legislation requires, as part of the acceptable Internet use
policies that public school divisions must file every two years,
that computers with Internet access be equipped with "blocking
devices" to prevent access to obscenity and child pornography.269
A highly debated piece of legislation requires: (1) all students
to learn the Pledge of Allegiance and to demonstrate such knowl-
edge;2 0 (2) each school board to require the daily recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance in each classroom of the school division;2'1
and (3) each school to ensure that an American flag is displayed
in each classroom.27 2 Every school board must determine the ap-
propriate time during the school day for the recitation of the
Pledge, and students must either stand and recite the Pledge
while facing the flag with their right hands over their hearts, or
in an appropriate salute if in uniform.2 3 However, no student
must recite the Pledge if he or his parent or legal guardian ob-
jects on religious, philosophical, or other grounds.27' Relatedly,
the controversial 2000 amendment to Virginia's "minute of si-
268. S.B. 1055, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Mar. 22, 2001,
ch. 483, 2001 Va. Acts 481) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-227.01 (Cum.
Supp. 2001)). Although the term, "career and technical education" reflects the increased
status and complexity of vocational education programs, there appear to be few substan-
tive changes made by the legislation. See id.
269. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-70.2 (Cum. Supp. 2001). This bill further requires the prin-
cipal or other chief administrator of any private school that satisfies the compulsory school
attendance law and accepts federal funds for Internet access (E-rate funds) to select a
technology for its computers that will do the same. Id.
270. Id. § 22.1-202(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001). Students exempt from reciting the pledge
must remain quietly standing or sitting at their desks while others recited the pledge and
must not make any display that disrupts or distracts others who are reciting the pledge.
Id. § 22.1-202(C) (Cum. Supp. 2001). Schools must provide appropriate accommodations
for students who are unable to comply with these procedures due to disability, and codes of
conduct shall apply to disruptive behavior during the recitation of the pledge. Id. The Of-
fice of the Attorney General must intervene on behalf of local schools boards and must
provide legal defense of these provisions. Id. § 22.1-202(D) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
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lence" statute275 withstood First Amendment scrutiny in the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. 6
Another enactment requires public schools to provide instruc-
tion on the dangers of alcohol abuse, underage drinking, and
drunk driving. 7 7 The Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control
must provide educational materials to the Department of Educa-
tion, which, in turn, must review and distribute to public schools
all approved materials. 8 Boards of Education are also directed to
publicize and disseminate to parents of students who are enrolled
in special education programs, or for whom a special education
placement has been recommended, information regarding current
federal laws and regulations addressing procedures and rights re-
lated to the placement and withdrawal of children in special edu-
cation.27 9
An amendment to the Code provides that the criminal records
history obtained by school boards for applicants who are offered
or who accept school employment, whether on a temporary, per-
manent, or part or full-time basis, address all felony and Class 1
misdemeanor convictions and equivalent offenses in other
states.28 ° Previously, records were searched for all felonies and
misdemeanors involving drugs, abuse or neglect of children,
moral turpitude, obscenity offenses, and/or sexual assault.28 ' In
addition, reports of all arrests of school employees, not just the
currently enumerated serious crimes, will now be reported to
school boards.21 2 These employees must then submit to finger-
printing and criminal history records checks.28 3
275. See id. § 22.1-203 (Repl. Vol. 2000); see also Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Annual Sur-
vey of Virginia Law: Legal Issues Involving Children, 34 U. RICH. L. REV'. 939, 967 (2000).
276. See Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2001), petition for cert. filed, 70
U.S.L.W. 3164 (U.S. Aug. 31, 2001) (No. 01-384).
277. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-206 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
278. Id.
279. Id. § 22.1-215.1 (Cum. Supp. 2001). The Superintendent of Public Instruction
must apprise local school boards of the provisions of this act by an Administrative Memo-
randum no later than thirty days after its enactment. Id. The bill was a recommendation
of the Joint Subcommittee Studying the Overrepresentation of African-American Students
in Special Education Programs.
280. Id. § 22.1-296.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
281. See id. § 22.1-296.2(A) (Repl. Vol. 2000).
282. Id. § 19.2-83.1 (Cum. Supp. 2001). Pursuant to Virginia Code section 22.1-296.1
applicants for school employment previously had to certify they had not been convicted of
a felony, crime of moral turpitude, or other specific crimes involving the abuse of a child.
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B. Case Law
There were only a few cases this year that dealt with children
with disabilities in the school system. In C.M. v. Board of Educa-
tion,2  the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
decided that a North Carolina statute requiring that a request for
a due process hearing be filed within sixty days of a state agency
decision was not inconsistent with the Individuals with Disabili-
ties Education Act.2 5 However, the parents of the child must re-
ceive adequate notice of the decision, and that did not occur in
this case. 6 In Brown v. Ramsey,8 7 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that two teachers'
physical restraint of a first grade special education student suf-
fering from Asperger's Syndrome, a neurological disorder similar
to autism, by use of a "basket hold" did not violate the boy's civil
rights.28 A Virginia circuit court ruled, in Colona v. Accomack
County School Board,8 9 that a school board has a duty to inform
its teachers of any students who have AIDS or who are HIV posi-
tive.290
The United States Supreme Court ruled in Good News Club v.
Milford Central School291 that public elementary schools permit-
ting non-religious groups to meet in school facilities after school
hours must allow religious groups to use the buildings as well. 92
The Court's 6-3 decision extends to elementary schools the same
constitutional principle previously articulated for public high
schools and universities.293
In Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Ass'n,94 the Court ruled that the private association's enforce-
ment of a regulation constituted "state action" for the purposes of
Id. § 22.1-296.1 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
283. Id. § 22.1-296.2(A) (Cure. Supp. 2001).
284. 241 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2001).
285. Id. at 376.
286. See id. at 385-88.
287. 121 F. Supp. 2d 911 (E.D. Va. 2000).
288. Id. at 923-25.
289. 52 Va. Cir. 421 (Cir. Ct. 2000) (Accomack County).
290. Id. at 424-26.
291. 121 S. Ct. 2093 (2001).
292. Id. at 2107.
293. See id.
294. 121 S. Ct. 924 (2001).
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the Fourteenth Amendment.295 In Brentwood, there was pervasive
public involvement and entanglement with the Athletic Associa-
tion.296 In Newton v. Slye,297 a federal district judge denied a pre-
liminary injunction to a high school English teacher and some of
his students seeking the reposting of a pamphlet about banned
books on the teacher's classroom door.29" The court concluded that
the posted pamphlet could be viewed as part of the curriculum
and therefore was not protected speech.299 In Baynard v. Law-
son,3 °° the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia ruled that a student who was sexually abused by a
teacher could recover from the school's principal for deliberate in-
difference to the charges, but that the school board could not be
held liable under Title IX where the board had no knowledge of
the activities. °1 The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled, in Linhart
v. Lawson,"2 that a trial judge improperly sustained a plea of
sovereign immunity for a school board for the acts of a bus driver
who struck a vehicle and inflicted injuries." 3
V. MENTAL HEALTH
A study by the Commission on Youth on the problem of youth
suicide resulted in the enactment of legislation that requires the
Department of Health to assume lead responsibility in the Com-
monwealth for coordinating activities concerning youth suicide
prevention.0 4 Another bill eliminated the seventy-two or ninety-
six-hour maximum extension periods for a commitment hearing
295. Id. at 929.
296. Id. at 933.
297. 116 F. Supp. 2d 677 (W.D. Va. 2000).
298. Id. at 679.
299. Id. at 684.
300. 112 F. Supp. 2d 524 (E.D. Va. 2000).
301. Id. at 532.
302. 261 Va. 30, 540 S.E.2d 875 (2001).
303. Id. at 37, 540 S.E.2d at 878. Virginia Code section 22.1-194 abrogates such immu-
nity to the extent of the board's insurance or self-insurance, but the driver retains such
immunity. See VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-194 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
304. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-73.7 (Repl. Vol. 2001). This responsibility includes coordina-
tion of the activities of the agencies of the Commonwealth pertaining to youth suicide pre-
vention in order to develop a comprehensive youth suicide prevention plan addressing the
promotion of health development, early identification, crisis intervention, and support to
survivors. Id. See generally Report of Commission on Youth, Youth Suicide Prevention
Plan, H. Doc. No. 29 (2001).
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to conform to the duration of a temporary detention order and
provides that when the maximum forty-eight-hour period of tem-
porary detention would expire on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
holiday, the person may be detained until the next day that is not
a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. °5
VI. MISCELLANEOUS
Provided that state pool funds are not used, an amendment to
the Comprehensive Services Act for At-Risk Youth and Fami-
lies 0 6 authorizes a community policy and management team,
upon approval of the participating governing bodies, to contract
with another such team to purchase coordination services."° An-
other bill requires the "family assessment and planning team" to
provide for the participation of foster parents in the assessment,
planning, and implementation of services when a child has a pro-
gram goal of permanent foster care, or is in a long-term foster
care placement.0 8 The case manager shall notify the foster par-
ents of a troubled youth of the time and place of all assessment
and planning meetings related to the youth.0 9 In addition, the
foster parents shall be given the opportunity to speak at the
meeting or submit written testimony if they are unable to attend,
and their opinions shall be considered by the family assessment
and planning team in its deliberations.310
The abortion statutes were amended in 2001 to establish cer-
tain conditions for obtaining informed written consent from a
pregnant woman of any age prior to performing an abortion.311
The conditions include the requirement that, at least twenty-four
hours before the abortion, each woman be given: (1) an explana-
tion of the proposed procedures or protocols; (2) notification that
she may withdraw her consent at any time prior to the procedure;
(3) an offer to speak with the physician who is to perform the
abortion; (4) a statement of the probable gestational age of the fe-
305. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
306. Id. §§ 2.2-5200 to -5214 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
307. Id. § 2.2-5206(14) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
308. Id. § 2.2-5208 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. § 18.2-76 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
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tus at the time the procedure is to be performed; and (5) an offer
to review printed materials that must be developed by the De-
partment of Health.312 Informed written consent is not required in
medical emergencies.313
In Taylor v. Commonwealth,314 the Supreme Court of Virginia
upheld a defendant's conviction for abduction as a principal in the
second degree for assisting a birth-father in the abduction of his
illegitimate ten-month-old child from the legal custody of the
child's mother.31 The Supreme Court of Virginia held in Thomp-
son v. Skate America, Inc.,36 that a business owner may be liable
to an invitee for the assaultive acts of a third person for which the
business was on notice.317 The court reaffirmed its earlier holding
that parents are not vicariously liable for the acts of their minor
children on a theory of negligent supervision.1
Teenage driving was a major focus during the 2001 Session of
the Virginia General Assembly in light of a series of high profile
automobile accidents involving teen drivers and multiple fatali-
ties.31 One major bill provides for the issuance of provisional
driver's licenses to persons less than eighteen years old.2 The
new legislation authorizes minors with licenses to operate a mo-
tor vehicle with no more than one passenger who is less than
eighteen years old until the holder's seventeenth birthday and no
more than three passengers under eighteen until the holder's
eighteenth birthday.321 The holder of such a license also cannot
drive between the hours of midnight and 4:00 a.m., except for cer-
312. Id § 18.2-76(B) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
313. Id. § 18.2-76(C) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
314. 260 Va. 683, 537 S.E.2d 592 (2000).
315. Id. at 690, 537 S.E.2d at 596.
316. 261 Va. 121, 540 S.E.2d 123 (2001).
317. Id. at 131, 540 S.E.2d at 128. The Motion for Judgment alleged that the third per-
son had been banned from the premises and yet the business did nothing to enforce the
ban or protect other patrons from assaults by the third person. Id. at 125-26, 540 S.E.2d
at 125.
318. Id. at 131-32, 540 S.E.2d at 128-29. See Bell v. Hudgins, 232 Va. 491, 352 S.E.2d
332 (1987).
319. See generally Carlos Santos, Tough Issues Surround Teen Driving; Group's Fatali-
ties Rise Dramatically, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH., Jan. 21, 2001, at Al (detailing an increase
in teenage traffic fatalities during 2000).
320. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-334.01 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
321. Id. The statute exempts members of the minor driver's family or household from
this limitation. Id.
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tain specified exceptions.322 In addition, persons under eighteen
must drive a motor vehicle for at least forty hours under a
learner's permit before receiving a provisional license.323
Another bill provided that where a minor's parents have been
awarded joint custody, both custodial parents must sign a request
to the Department of Motor Vehicles before the department will
cancel the minor's driver's license.3" If one parent is not reasona-
bly available, or if the parents disagree, one parent may petition
the juvenile and domestic relations district court for a determina-
tion of the issue. 25 A third enactment provides that it is the date
of the violation, not the date of the conviction, that will subject a
driver who is less than eighteen years old to those requirements
and restrictions not applicable to drivers who are eighteen years
of age or older. 6
In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,127 the United States Su-
preme Court ruled that Massachusetts regulations barring to-
bacco advertising and sales within a certain distance of a school
were either pre-empted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act 28 or were overly broad and violated the First
Amendment.329 In Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Ser-
vice331 the Supreme Court concluded that Congress could legally
treat the American fathers of illegitimate children born abroad
differently than mothers for the purpose of establishing the citi-
zenship of those children.33 ' Justice O'Connor dissented in a
strong opinion charging that the majority had abandoned nearly
three decades of cases applying "heightened scrutiny to legislative
classifications based on sex." 32
322. Id.
323. Id. § 46.2-335(B) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
324. Id. § 46.2-334(B) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
325. Id.
326. Id. § 46.2-334.01 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
327. 121 S. Ct. 2404 (2001).
328. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1994).
329. Lorillard, 121 S. Ct. at 2430.
330. 121 S. Ct. 2053 (2001).
331. Id. at 2058.
332. Id. at 2066 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor was joined by Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
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